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Normalize App parameter declaration (doc-include folders, boot)

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This commit is contained in:
Hypolite Petovan 2017-01-09 23:09:01 +11:00
parent ee39aba490
commit 87eb3d5ef2
20 changed files with 142 additions and 142 deletions
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54
include/security.php
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@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ function authenticate_success($user_record, $login_initial = false, $interactive
function can_write_wall(&$a,$owner) {
function can_write_wall(App $a, $owner) {
static $verified = 0;
@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ function can_write_wall(&$a,$owner) {
return false;
}
$r = q("SELECT `contact`.*, `user`.`page-flags` FROM `contact` INNER JOIN `user` on `user`.`uid` = `contact`.`uid`
WHERE `contact`.`uid` = %d AND `contact`.`id` = %d AND `contact`.`blocked` = 0 AND `contact`.`pending` = 0
$r = q("SELECT `contact`.*, `user`.`page-flags` FROM `contact` INNER JOIN `user` on `user`.`uid` = `contact`.`uid`
WHERE `contact`.`uid` = %d AND `contact`.`id` = %d AND `contact`.`blocked` = 0 AND `contact`.`pending` = 0
AND `user`.`blockwall` = 0 AND `readonly` = 0 AND ( `contact`.`rel` IN ( %d , %d ) OR `user`.`page-flags` = %d ) LIMIT 1",
intval($owner),
intval($cid),
@ -183,10 +183,10 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) {
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
$sql = " AND allow_cid = ''
AND allow_gid = ''
AND deny_cid = ''
AND deny_gid = ''
$sql = " AND allow_cid = ''
AND allow_gid = ''
AND deny_cid = ''
AND deny_gid = ''
";
/**
@ -194,11 +194,11 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) {
*/
if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) {
$sql = '';
$sql = '';
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
@ -224,11 +224,11 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) {
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . intval($g) . '>';
}
}
/*$sql = sprintf(
" AND ( allow_cid = '' OR allow_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
AND ( deny_cid = '' OR NOT deny_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
" AND ( allow_cid = '' OR allow_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
AND ( deny_cid = '' OR NOT deny_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
AND ( allow_gid = '' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' )
AND ( deny_gid = '' OR NOT deny_gid REGEXP '%s')
",
@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ function item_permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null)
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
@ -306,13 +306,13 @@ function item_permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null)
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . intval($g) . '>';
}
}
$sql = sprintf(
/*" AND ( private = 0 OR ( private in (1,2) AND wall = 1 AND ( allow_cid = '' OR allow_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
AND ( deny_cid = '' OR NOT deny_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
/*" AND ( private = 0 OR ( private in (1,2) AND wall = 1 AND ( allow_cid = '' OR allow_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
AND ( deny_cid = '' OR NOT deny_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
AND ( allow_gid = '' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' )
AND ( deny_gid = '' OR NOT deny_gid REGEXP '%s')))
AND ( deny_gid = '' OR NOT deny_gid REGEXP '%s')))
",
intval($remote_user),
intval($remote_user),
@ -345,29 +345,29 @@ function item_permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null)
* If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer.
* Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are,
* so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types).
*/
*/
function get_form_security_token($typename = '') {
$a = get_app();
$timestamp = time();
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename);
return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash;
}
function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false;
$hash = $_REQUEST[$formname];
$max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours
$a = get_app();
$x = explode('.', $hash);
if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) return false;
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename);
return ($sec_hash == $x[1]);
}
@ -395,13 +395,13 @@ function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'f
// Returns an array of group id's this contact is a member of.
// This array will only contain group id's related to the uid of this
// DFRN contact. They are *not* neccessarily unique across the entire site.
// DFRN contact. They are *not* neccessarily unique across the entire site.
if(! function_exists('init_groups_visitor')) {
function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) {
$groups = array();
$r = q("SELECT `gid` FROM `group_member`
$r = q("SELECT `gid` FROM `group_member`
WHERE `contact-id` = %d ",
intval($contact_id)
);