$atoken['atoken_id'], 'xchan_hash' => substr($c['channel_hash'], 0, 16) . '.' . $atoken['atoken_guid'], 'xchan_name' => $atoken['atoken_name'], 'xchan_addr' => 'guest:' . $atoken['atoken_name'] . '@' . App::get_hostname(), 'xchan_network' => 'token', 'xchan_url' => z_root() . '/guest/' . substr($c['channel_hash'], 0, 16) . '.' . $atoken['atoken_guid'], 'xchan_hidden' => 1, 'xchan_photo_mimetype' => 'image/png', 'xchan_photo_l' => z_root() . '/' . Channel::get_default_profile_photo(300), 'xchan_photo_m' => z_root() . '/' . Channel::get_default_profile_photo(80), 'xchan_photo_s' => z_root() . '/' . Channel::get_default_profile_photo(48) ]; } return null; } function atoken_delete($atoken_id) { $r = q( "select * from atoken where atoken_id = %d", intval($atoken_id) ); if (! $r) { return; } $c = q( "select channel_id, channel_hash from channel where channel_id = %d", intval($r[0]['atoken_uid']) ); if (! $c) { return; } $atoken_xchan = substr($c[0]['channel_hash'], 0, 16) . '.' . $r[0]['atoken_guid']; q( "delete from atoken where atoken_id = %d", intval($atoken_id) ); q( "delete from abook where abook_channel = %d and abook_xchan = '%s'", intval($c[0]['channel_id']), dbesc($atoken_xchan) ); q( "delete from abconfig where chan = %d and xchan = '%s'", intval($c[0]['channel_id']), dbesc($atoken_xchan) ); } /** * @brief * * In order for atoken logins to create content (such as posts) they need a stored xchan. * we'll create one on atoken creation; it can't really ever go away but perhaps * @fixme we should set xchan_deleted if it's expired or removed * * @param array $xchan * @return void|bool */ function atoken_create_xchan($xchan) { $r = q( "select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'", dbesc($xchan['xchan_hash']) ); if ($r) { return; } $xchan['xchan_guid'] = $xchan['xchan_hash']; $store = []; foreach ($xchan as $k => $v) { if (strpos($k, 'xchan_') === 0) { $store[$k] = $v; } } $r = xchan_store_lowlevel($store); return true; } function atoken_abook($uid, $xchan_hash) { if (substr($xchan_hash, 16, 1) != '.') { return false; } $r = q( "select channel_hash from channel where channel_id = %d limit 1", intval($uid) ); if (! $r) { return false; } $x = q( "select * from atoken where atoken_uid = %d and atoken_guid = '%s'", intval($uid), dbesc(substr($xchan_hash, 17)) ); if ($x) { $xchan = atoken_xchan($x[0]); $xchan['abook_blocked'] = 0; $xchan['abook_ignored'] = 0; $xchan['abook_pending'] = 0; return $xchan; } return false; } function pseudo_abook($xchan) { if (! $xchan) { return false; } // set abook_pseudo to flag that we aren't really connected. $xchan['abook_pseudo'] = 1; $xchan['abook_blocked'] = 0; $xchan['abook_ignored'] = 0; $xchan['abook_pending'] = 0; return $xchan; } /** * @brief Change to another channel with current logged-in account. * * @param int $change_channel The channel_id of the channel you want to change to * * @return bool|array false or channel record of the new channel */ function change_channel($change_channel) { $ret = false; if ($change_channel) { $r = q( "select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_account_id = %d and channel_removed = 0 limit 1", intval($change_channel), intval(get_account_id()) ); // It's not there. Is this an administrator, and is this the sys channel? if (! $r) { if (is_developer() || is_site_admin()) { $r = q( "select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_system = 1 and channel_removed = 0 limit 1", intval($change_channel) ); } } if ($r) { $hash = $r[0]['channel_hash']; $_SESSION['uid'] = intval($r[0]['channel_id']); App::set_channel($r[0]); $_SESSION['theme'] = $r[0]['channel_theme']; $_SESSION['mobile_theme'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(), 'system', 'mobile_theme'); $_SESSION['cloud_tiles'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(), 'system', 'cloud_tiles'); $_SESSION['loadtime_channel'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(), 'system', 'loadtime_channel', '2000-01-01 00:00:00'); $_SESSION['loadtime_stream'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(), 'system', 'loadtime_stream', '2000-01-01 00:00:00'); $_SESSION['loadtime_pubstream'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(), 'system', 'loadtime_pubstream', '2000-01-01 00:00:00'); $_SESSION['seen_items'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(), 'system', 'seen_items', []); date_default_timezone_set($r[0]['channel_timezone']); // Update the active timestamp at most once a day if (substr($r[0]['channel_active'], 0, 10) !== substr(Time::convert(), 0, 10) && (! (isset($_SESSION['sudo']) && $_SESSION['sudo']))) { $z = q( "UPDATE channel SET channel_active = '%s' WHERE channel_id = %d", dbesc(Time::convert()), intval($r[0]['channel_id']) ); } $ret = $r[0]; } $x = xchan_match([ 'xchan_hash' => $hash ]); if ($x) { $_SESSION['my_url'] = $x['xchan_url']; $_SESSION['my_address'] = Channel::get_webfinger($r[0]); App::set_observer($x); App::set_perms(get_all_perms(local_channel(), $hash)); } if (! is_dir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address'])) { Stdio::mkdir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address'], STORAGE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS, true); } $arr = [ 'channel_id' => $change_channel, 'chanx' => $ret ]; Hook::call('change_channel', $arr); } return $ret; } /** * @brief Creates an additional SQL where statement to check permissions. * * @param int $owner_id * @param bool $remote_observer (optional) use current observer if unset * @param $table (optional) * * @return string additional SQL where statement */ function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '', $token = EMPTY_STR) { $local_channel = local_channel(); /** * Construct permissions * * default permissions - anonymous user */ if ($table) { $table .= '.'; } $sql = " AND {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '' AND {$table}deny_cid = '' AND {$table}deny_gid = '' "; /** * Profile owner - everything is visible */ if (($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) { return EMPTY_STR; } /** * Authenticated visitor. */ else { $observer = ((! is_null($remote_observer)) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash()); if ($observer) { $sec = get_security_ids($owner_id, $observer); if ($token) { if (! array_key_exists('allow_cid', $sec)) { $sec['allow_cid'] = []; } $sec['allow_cid'][] = 'token:' . $token; } // always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor if ($sec['channel_id']) { foreach ($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) { if ($observer === $ch) { return EMPTY_STR; } } } if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) { $ca = []; foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) { $ca[] = '<' . $c . '>'; } $cs = implode('|', $ca); } else { $cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) { $ga = []; foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) { $ga[] = '<' . $g . '>'; } $gs = implode('|', $ga); } else { $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } $regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP'); $sql = sprintf( " AND ( NOT ({$table}deny_cid $regexop '%s' OR {$table}deny_gid $regexop '%s') AND ( {$table}allow_cid $regexop '%s' OR {$table}allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '') ) ) ", dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs), dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs) ); } /* * OCAP token access */ elseif ($token) { $sql = " and ( {$table}allow_cid like '" . protect_sprintf('%%') . "' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '' AND {$table}deny_cid = '' AND {$table}deny_gid = '' ) )"; } } return $sql; } /** * @brief Creates an additional SQL where statement to check permissions for an item. * * @param int $owner_id * @param bool $remote_observer (optional) use current observer if unset * * @return string additional SQL where statement */ function item_permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null) { $local_channel = local_channel(); /** * Construct permissions * * default permissions - anonymous user */ $sql = " AND item_private = 0 "; /** * Profile owner - everything is visible */ if (($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) { $sql = ''; } /** * Authenticated visitor. */ else { $observer = (($remote_observer) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash()); if ($observer) { $sec = get_security_ids($owner_id, $observer); // always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor if ($sec['channel_id']) { foreach ($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) { if ($observer === $ch) { return EMPTY_STR; } } } if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) { $ca = []; foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) { $ca[] = '<' . $c . '>'; } $cs = implode('|', $ca); } else { $cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) { $ga = []; foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) { $ga[] = '<' . $g . '>'; } $gs = implode('|', $ga); } else { $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } // This function is often called without an $owner_id in places where this could not be // determined in advance. The ACL fields will usually not contain the original author or owner // so we will also check for author_xchan and owner_xchan to account for this ACL deficiency. $regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP'); $sql = sprintf( " AND ( author_xchan = '%s' OR owner_xchan = '%s' OR (( NOT (deny_cid $regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s') AND ( allow_cid $regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 )) ))) ", dbesc($observer), dbesc($observer), dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs), dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs) ); } } return $sql; } /** * @param string $observer_hash * * @return string additional SQL where statement */ function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) { $owner_id = 0; if ($observer_hash) { $sec = get_security_ids($owner_id, $observer_hash); if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) { $ca = []; foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) { $ca[] = '<' . $c . '>'; } $cs = implode('|', $ca); } else { $cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) { $ga = []; foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) { $ga[] = '<' . $g . '>'; } $gs = implode('|', $ga); } else { $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } $regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP'); $sql = sprintf( " AND ( NOT (deny_cid $regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s') AND ( allow_cid $regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0) ) ) ", dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs), dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs) ); } else { $sql = " and item_private = 0 "; } return $sql; } /* * Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery * The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key. * In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes; * or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours). * The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case: * A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link). * If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer. * Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are, * so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types). */ function get_form_security_token($typename = '') { $timestamp = time(); $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', App::$observer['xchan_guid'] . ((local_channel()) ? App::$channel['channel_prvkey'] : '') . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename); return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash; } function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) { return false; } $hash = $_REQUEST[$formname]; $max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours $x = explode('.', $hash); if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) { return false; } $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', App::$observer['xchan_guid'] . ((local_channel()) ? App::$channel['channel_prvkey'] : '') . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename); return ($sec_hash == $x[1]); } function check_form_security_std_err_msg() { return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before submitting it.') . EOL; } function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) { logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . App::$observer['xchan_name'] . ' - form element ' . $typename); logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA); notice(check_form_security_std_err_msg()); goaway(z_root() . $err_redirect); } } function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) { logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . App::$observer['xchan_name'] . ' - form element ' . $typename); logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA); header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden'); killme(); } } function get_security_ids($channel_id, $ob_hash) { $ret = [ 'channel_id' => [], 'allow_cid' => [], 'allow_gid' => [] ]; if ($channel_id) { $ch = q( "select channel_hash from channel where channel_id = %d", intval($channel_id) ); if ($ch) { $ret['channel_id'][] = $ch[0]['channel_hash']; } } $groups = []; $x = q( "select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'", dbesc($ob_hash) ); if ($x) { // include xchans for all zot-like networks $xchans = q( "select xchan_hash, xchan_network from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' OR ( xchan_guid = '%s' AND xchan_pubkey = '%s' ) ", dbesc($ob_hash), dbesc($x[0]['xchan_guid']), dbesc($x[0]['xchan_pubkey']) ); if ($xchans) { $ret['allow_cid'] = ids_to_array($xchans, 'xchan_hash'); $hashes = ids_to_querystr($xchans, 'xchan_hash', true); // physical groups this identity is a member of $r = q("SELECT hash FROM pgrp left join pgrp_member on pgrp.id = pgrp_member.gid WHERE xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) "); if ($r) { foreach ($r as $rv) { $groups[] = $rv['hash']; } } // virtual groups this identity is a member of $r = q("select channel_hash from channel left join abook on channel_id = abook_channel where abook_xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) and abook_self = 0 and abook_pending = 0 and abook_archived = 0 "); if ($r) { foreach ($r as $rv) { $groups[] = 'connections:' . $rv['channel_hash']; if ($xchans[0]['xchan_network'] === 'nomad') { $groups[] = 'nomad:' . $rv['channel_hash']; } if ($xchans[0]['xchan_network'] === 'zot6') { $groups[] = 'zot:' . $rv['channel_hash']; } if ($xchans[0]['xchan_network'] === 'activitypub') { $groups[] = 'activitypub:' . $rv['channel_hash']; } } } $ret['allow_gid'] = $groups; } } return $ret; }